Introduction
Shifting the discussion to the other main contemporary challenge to liberal freedom, this portion of the book focuses on the tension regarding the very definition and scope of fundamental liberal values and rights such as liberty in multicultural democracies. As already pointed out at the course of the first chapter, our interest in this challenge arises for two interrelated reasons.
The first reason is that owing to the cleavage over the two presumably rival concepts of liberty, proponents of "negative" liberty alone tend to be absent from the discourse regarding multiculturalism. Hence, if one adopts the minimal-government idea, opposing any or at least most possible government intervention in the individual's thought and action, attending to the manner in which liberaldemocratic governments may accommodate group rights is clearly not included within such a viewpoint. Therefore, if the suggested empowering model of liberty, specifically in its Lockean classical liberalism version, might be applicable for the issue at stake here, it raises doubts with respect to the alienation of most neo-liberals and right-libertarians from the discourse(s) about multiculturalism.
The second reason for our interest in the discussions about multiculturalism is that this subject constitutes a main challenge within contemporary discourse and praxis of liberal democracy. As such, and since this challenge is largely related to the liberal value and political right to liberty, it would be intriguing to explore whether the proposed empowering liberty model might be helpful in approaching this challenge. Moreover, if the answer to this question is affirmative, then the absence of the supposedly contemporary subscribers of classical liberalism, namely neo-liberals and right-libertarians, from these discussions is even more problematic.
In what follows, I will show how the gap between two poles of citizenship theory, underlying the tension regarding the definition and scope of fundamental liberal values like liberty in a multicultural society, can be decreased even from the most conservative liberal viewpoint. By further developing Locke's conception of liberty as it is depicted through the suggested empowering liberty model, and elaborating on the linkage between this model and his conception of political participation, two distinct yet reciprocally connected forms of political participation are illuminated: a democratic-majoritarian political participation envisioned in the Second Treatise, and a deliberative-unmajoritarian depicted in of the Conduct of the Understanding.
1 Therefore, it is suggested that, contrary to the contemporary liberal-constitutionalist stance, adopting the Lockean version of the empowering liberty model shows that even within its most conservative form, liberalism can be understood as espousing a mixed model of "liberal-deliberative" constitutionalism.
By achieving these goals, and reasserting the linkage between the two forms of political participation and the empowering liberty model, as it has been specifically extracted from Locke's thought, the current chapter will raise further doubts as to neo-liberal and right-libertarian stance regarding "positive" liberty. At the same time, through developing the aforementioned linkage, the current chapter will enhance the basic empowering liberty model, emphasizing its societal level of empowerment. Such enhancement will also show that this instance of a "deliberative-liberal" constitutionalism is indeed supported by and encompassed in the whole empowering liberty model, already extracted from Locke's works in Chapter 2. In other words, the current chapter continues the same direction of development suggested in the previous chapter, concerning the empowering liberty model.
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One manner in which contemporary political philosophy discourse concerning the meaning of citizenship and civic identity in multicultural
